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at the University of Sussex makes a big claim
E
xtensive reading around the
advances in life sciences makes it
easy to envision a gloomy future
in which the hostile exploitation of
cutting-edge biotechnology leads to the
destruction of human kind. Yet there is
a need for caution in reading too much
into the hostile potential of clustered
regularly interspaced short
palindromic repeats (Crispr) and other
shiny new technologies, not least
because of the continued complexity
and unpredictability of biological
systems. Nonetheless, the rapid
development of biotechnology warrants
sustained attention from those looking
to prohibit and prevent biological
warfare and ensure that the
development of technologies of
relevance to biological weapons do not
leave the biological disarmament
regime obsolete.
Changing science and technology
It has frequently been argued that
advances in science and technology will
make significant acts of biological
weaponeering ever easier and quicker to
realise, with developments in fields such
as bioinformatics, systems biology,
neurobiology, nanotechnology and drug
delivery, feeding into ever greater
possibilities for the hostile exploitation
of biology. Of particular note over the
course of the last decade has been
synthetic biology, a field which seeks to
design and build new biological parts
and systems or to modify existing ones
to carry out novel tasks”.2 While lauded
as a solution to many societal problems,
one assessment of the risk of synthetic
biology was outlined in 2011. A
background paper on science and
technology submitted to the Biological
and Toxin Weapons Convention by
China, noted: 
“With the spread of synthetic
biology, some small scale research
groups and even some individuals are
now able to make the deadly Ebola and
smallpox viruses and even some
viruses against which all drugs are
ineffective, thus making it much
harder to counter bioterrorism.”3
If orange is indeed the new black,
gene editing technology such as Crispr,
is this season’s synthetic biology, a
source of both promise and peril that
has become emblematic of the dangers
of dual use biotechnology. In February
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2016, James R Clapper, the director of
national intelligence, identified gene
editing technologies as being of
particular concern, stating that:“Given
the broad distribution, low cost, and
accelerated pace of development of this
dual-use technology, its deliberate or
unintentional misuse might lead to far-
reaching economic and national
security implications.”4 A blunter
assessment of Crispr is evident in
Gerstien’s provocatively titled paper,
Can the Bioweapons Convention
Survive Crispr?, which suggested that
Crispr was widely available, allowing
even largely untrained people to
manipulate the very essence of life.
Crispr-based kits go for less than $500
in some cases, with pathogen-specific
kits, for instance West Nile virus…,
offered up like so many choices at a
grocery store.5
There are reasonable grounds for
concern over Crispr. The technology
offers a relatively flexible, simple,
effective tool to enable the introduction
of changes to DNA within cells6 and
empowers scientists with the capacity
not only to read through gene
sequencing and write through gene
synthesis, but now theoretically ‘edit the
text’ inside cells.7
To date Crispr Cas9 appears to have
generated the most attention; however,
other types and variants of Crispr, such
as Cpf1 and C2c2, are being explored
and these may offer distinct advantages
in the future as research shifts from
understanding to application in a
potentially wide range of peaceful
fields.8 Although, thus far Crispr only
appears to have been applied for
peaceful purposes, the attention gene
editing technology has received
suggests it would be remarkable if the
technology were not explored further
in the advent of sophisticated future
biological weapons programmes
seeking to exploit the latest scientific
advances for hostile purposes. 
Don’t panic
Despite the potential of Crispr for
peaceful, as well as harmful, purposes,
the notion of gene editing is a rather
misleading metaphor conveying as it
does unrealistic expectations of human
control.9 Such technological
breakthroughs are frequently
accompanied by a series of promises
that are amplified through media
attention in the early stages of what
Gartner labelled the hype cycle. 
Beginning with a technology trigger
following early proof-of-concept stories
and media interest, over time
technology follows through the hype
cycle reach to what Gartner label a peak
of inflated expectations before sliding
down into a trough of disillusionment
in which interest wanes as experiments
and implementations fail to deliver10.
Although technologies frequently
recover to ascend the slope of
enlightenment, generating societal
value in the process, interest and
investment is often more cautious.  
This notion of a hype cycle is an
imperfect tool for predicting peaceful
technology adoption, but nonetheless
has a value in separating hype from the
real drivers of a technology's
commercial promise and informing
investment decisions. It also encourages
a reality check in relation to dual use
technologies and a counter to some of
the more doom-ladened prophecies
about developments in biotechnology.
Indeed, for all the progress in the life
sciences, significant gaps remain in
understanding and reliably predicting
the effects of gene editing; let alone
weaponising such genes, something
which requires a series of additional
steps – and additional skills and
knowledge - to get close to a feasible
weapon. As the SPIEZ Convergence
report from 2016 stated regarding gene
engineering ...is this easy to do? The
answer is no. It requires more than
understanding and using Crispr, and
depends on a range of further
knowledge, skills and capacities relating
to the host and its biology.11
Changing the life science landscape
One of the counters to this argument is
perceived changes in the landscape of
life science research; specifically, the so
called democratisation of biotechnology,
a step which Gerstein suggests may
already have brought biological attacks
within the reach of terror groups like al
Qaeda and ISIS…12
Again, there are reasonable grounds
for concern about the changing human
geography of the life sciences. Certainly,
there has been an expansion of ‘DIY-bio’
groups from one in 2008, to around 40
local DIY-bio groups, with the majority
in the US and Europe in 2013;13 to 95
DIY-bio registered groups around the
world in early 2017, the majority of
which are located in North America and
Europe14. The groups registered on
DIYbio.org, vary considerably, from
established physical laboratories, such
as the London Biohackspace, to web
pages for online groups, and have led to
a rash of reports alluding to the
possibility of basement bioterrorism. 
Similarly, the International
Genetically Engineered Machine (iGEM)
Foundation’s competition has generated
much attention, demonstrating as it
does the extent to which undergraduate
- and high school – students are able to
manipulate biology. As with DIY-bio, the
number of iGEM participants has grown
considerably: from five teams and 31
participants in US universities in 2004;
to 300 teams and 4,432 participants
from across the globe in 201615.
Moreover, the achievements of iGEM
teams are remarkable: from developing a
framework for engineering co-cultures16
to arming bacteria with targeted and
specific toxin production against mites.17
Still, don’t panic!
What is often missing from accounts of
the iGEM teams’ achievements are the
difficulties and dogged determination of
the students in repeating assembly
procedures and experiments that failed
and persisting with efforts to solve
problems. Also understated is the extent
to which topics such as biosafety,
biosecurity and risk management are
addressed in iGEM challenges, in part
through the inclusion of iGEM biosafety
committees. 
DIY-bio groups are perhaps more of a
concern, not least because of the
possibility of co-locating life science
expertise with other engineering skills
outside the traditional laboratory setting.
However, as a report on the seven myths
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& realities about do-it-yourself biology
has indicated, most DIY-ers are still
learning basic biotechnology and most
groups are limited to biosafety level 1
(BSL-1) organisms with few exceptions18.
The authors interaction with one UK
DIY-bio facility further suggest that,
rather than an aversion to government
oversight and safety/security procedures,
some DIY bio groups at least have
undertaken measures designed to ensure
safety and security. These include the
appointment of an experienced biosafety
officer, laboratory rules, access controls,
safety training, standard operating
procedures, risk assessment processes
and codes of conduct. 
It is unlikely that all DIY-bio groups
and amateur biologists are subjected to
such rigour. Neither is it likely that
biologists operating outside the
traditional laboratory setting would
easily be able to misuse Crispr-based
kits purchased from grocery stores for
the purpose of mass casualty terrorism.
Biological WMD may be seductive to
those seeking to cause harm, but in
reality, achieving biological weapons
with gigantic effect would present a
considerable challenge for non-state
actors. This, of course, does not prevent
terrorists or criminals from pursuing
‘scruffy’ improvised biological weapons,
but the costs of pursuing such weapons
– including the opportunity costs of not
pursuing other more credible routes –
are likely to be significant in the
calculus of whether such weapons
should be pursued.
Biological disarmament
Developments in science and
technology (S&T) nonetheless have
major implications for how biological
weapons are perceived. Over the course
of the last century growing
understanding of aerobiology and
contagion engendered the theoretical
possibility of strategic biological
weapons, delivered not only through
food and water contamination, but also
through the air. As such, the fact a
technology has been hyped doesn’t
mean it should be ignored by those
endeavouring to prevent the re-
emergence of biological warfare,
including practitioners of biological
disarmament diplomacy working on the
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). 
S&T is particularly important for
this convention, with potential
technological developments generating
positive and negative implications for
various aspects of this international
agreement. Most obviously, changes in
S&T can present challenges to the
scope of the regime, potentially
fragmenting international
understandings as to what is prohibited
and what is permitted. This is clearly
important, but it is not the only area
where S&T can have an impact. 
The digitisation of biotechnology
and growing challenge of intangible
biological information presents a major
challenge to export control measures; a
changing landscape of life science
research has implications for national
measures designed to prohibit and
prevent biological weapons. Advances in
detecting, reporting and mitigating
outbreaks of disease clearly have
implications for the provision of
assistance in the event of a violation of
the convention; and changes in
communications technology and
collaborative practices have a bearing
on international cooperation. For what
it is worth, changes in S&T will also
have had a profound effect on efforts to
evaluate compliance with the
convention, although this remains a
fractious topic that is unlikely to be on
the agenda in the near future. 
Given the significance of S&T to this
international agreement, it is
unsurprising that there was widespread
support around the principle of
enhancing the process of reviewing
science and technology under the BWC
in the run-up to the review conference
in late 2016. However, as Littlewood
pointed out in the previous edition of
CBRNe World, the conference resulted
in a disappointing outcome, in which
proposals for enhanced S&T reviews in
future work between review conferences
failed to come to fruition. Perhaps more
than any other issue, this omission of
S&T from the agenda of multilateral
biological disarmament diplomacy
raises the possibility of the Biological
and Toxin Weapons Convention
becoming detached from real world
events19. The next meeting of states
parties in December 2017 offers an
opportunity to rectify this omission and
restore S&T to the agenda. It is hoped
states will seize this chance and should
they do so, it will be important not to
follow the hype and fixate on the
negative potential of any one single
technology to cause harm; but
collectively remain alert to technical -
and sociotechnical – changes of
relevance to the convention, and
respond accordingly. 
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